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Abstract 
Melbourne‟s unique franchise model for public transport management and service delivery, 
now a decade old, is a subject of international interest for practitioners and scholars of 
transport planning. 
In December 2009, two new franchisees, under reworked eight-year contract arrangements, 
took over the operation of Melbourne‟s train and tram systems ending the ten-year run of the 
two survivors of the first decade of public transport privatisation – Connex (Veolia) and the 
Transdev/Transfield consortium.  
Based on material from public documents and interviews with senior managers from the 
departing companies and the Victorian Department of Transport, this research uses the 
perspectives of the departing franchisees, with their previous intimate engagement and 
current detachment from on-going operational and institutional issues, to provide a unique 
insight into the dynamics of Melbourne‟s franchise system.  
The research explores the lessons of the first decade of privatisation of transit operations in 
Melbourne. It examines financial performance, the value to government of the franchises as 
a means to distance itself from public criticism over the operation of public transport, and the 
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1. Introduction 
Introduced during the wave of privatisations of public utilities in Britain, Australia and New 
Zealand in the 1980s and 1990s, the franchise operation of Melbourne‟s tram and train 
systems is a unique experiment in the application neo-liberal ideologies to the design and 
delivery of metropolitan public transport services. Its performance, over the decade since the 
first contracts were signed in 1999, has been hotly debated. 
Support has come from expected ideological quarters such as the IPA (Allsop 2007), who 
rely in large part on data and analysis provided by Jim Betts, an architect and current chief 
regulator of the franchises as Secretary of the Victorian Department of Transport (DoT). The 
principal academic critic, Paul Mees, (2005, 2010) bases his analysis on benchmarking of 
the performance of Melbourne‟s public transport governance regime against cities that have 
achieved long-term improvements in public transport patronage and operational efficiency. In 
the court of public opinion, privatisation is clearly seen as a major cause of the many current 
ills of the system. 
In this research, the voices of the franchisees themselves are heard through interviews with 
senior managers of Connex and Yarra Trams1. Both companies had held franchises, for the 
trains and trams respectively, since 1999, but each lost its bid to continue when the 
government re-tendered for operation of the services in 2009.  
While the perspectives of the franchisees represent only one view on a complex set of 
issues, they are very valuable for their immediacy of the links to current debates and in the 
frankness that their departure from the scene allows. Although interpretation of events may 
vary, some confirmation of facts was achieved through an interview conducted with Hector 
McKenzie, the current Director of the Public Transport Division within the DoT, and 
statements made by interviewees were checked against material on the public record.    
To evaluate the intentions and performance of the franchises, three broad areas are 
covered: financial performance; the value to government of the franchises as a means to 
divert criticism over the operation of public transport; and the effectiveness of planning for 
current and future patronage growth. The conclusions reached in each of these areas 
provide a useful component of a fuller assessment of the outcomes of the franchising 






                                            
1
 A joint interview with Connex managers (Jonathan Metcalfe (CEO), Mark Paterson (Director, 
Corporate Affairs) and Chris White (General Manager, Network Development)) was undertaken on 8 
Dec 2009. Dennis Cliche, CEO of Yarra Trams under the Transdev/Transfield franchise was 
interviewed on 4 March 2010. All unattributed quotes are from these interviews.   
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2. Franchising in Melbourne: intention and performance 
A brief history of the operation of the tram and train franchises is set out in Table 1. 
1999 - Train and tram operations privatised with two competing regions created 
for each mode. Three private operators took up the four franchises on 
offer: National Express (Bayside Trains (M-Train) and Swanston Trams 
(M-Tram)); Transdev/Transfield (Yarra Trams); and Connex (Hillside 
Trains) 
- ALP elected 
2000 M-Tram and M-Train report financial difficulties 
2001 - Decision not to build Rowville/ Monash rail line 
- Box Hill tram extension paid for by the government 
- Sydenham rail extension paid for by the government 
2002 - Financial „rescue package‟ (AUD$110m) for operators  
- Collapse of National Express franchises (for M-Train and M-Tram); 
government faces crisis in franchise system 
- Airport rail link concept scrapped 
2003 State government rescues franchise system by creating new franchise 
model based on a single operator for each mode 
2004 Government negotiates with Connex and Yarra Trams and new train and 
tram franchises are signed 
2006 Proposal for $1b rail expansion to Dandenong line as part of government 
plan Meeting Our Transport Challenges (later abandoned) 
2007 - Existing Connex and Yarra Trams contracts extended by 12 months to 
November 2009 
- Overcrowding on peak hour trams and trains („Early Bird‟ offers begin) 
- Siemens trains suffer braking problems; speed restrictions imposed  
2008 - Announcement of possible 2 year delay on new Myki ticketing system 
- Five „Bumblebee‟ trams leased from France 
- Release of State Government‟s Victorian Transport Plan 
2009 - New franchises announced (June); both existing operators are replaced 
(Metro Trains Melbourne and Keolis Downer EDI, which chose to trade as 
Yarra Trams); 8-year contracts signed 
- Buyback of retired Hitachi trains 
2010 - Delays in delivery of new trains 
- Continuing brake problems with Siemens trains 
Table 1: Major events in franchising of Melbourne’s trams and trains since 1999 
 
The first moves towards the adoption of franchising as the preferred model for public 
transport governance came with the election of the Kennett Government in 1992, but it took 
some time for the proponents of a privatised system to develop a model that would ensure 
profitability for private interests (Cole 2003). In 1995, the Treasurer, Alan Stockdale, 
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established the Transport Reform Unit (TRU) within his department to refine the details of a 
franchising model. The current Secretary of the Department of Transport, Jim Betts, came to 
Melbourne from the UK to work in the TRU. (He has been intimately involved with all phases 
of privatisation in Melbourne, writing key sections of apparently independent analyses of its 
performance including the audit review of government contracts initiated by the incoming 
ALP government (Russell et al. 2000), which was instrumental in locking in ALP support for 
franchising during the financial crises of 2002-04.)  
The preferred option of the TRU was to create four „competing‟ corporations – two for 
suburban train and two for tram operations – for later sale or franchising to the private sector 
through competitive bidding.      
The expectations of the architects of the 1999 privatisation of Melbourne‟s trams and trains 
were clear: “bringing in private operators would have (positive) effects on efficiency, service 
delivery (and) customer focus” (Stockdale, quoted in Cole, p. 30).  
It is beyond the scope of this paper to assess the performance of franchises in detail, but two 
parameters can be examined as proxies for Stockdale‟s stated expectations. These are 
financial performance and effectiveness in planning for growth. A third area for investigation 
is the way government has used the franchise arrangements as a means to „spin‟ its 
relationship with the public over transport issues.   
2.1. Financial performance 
There has been heated debate about the financial performance of the public transport 
franchises. Most of this hinged on a report by the Victorian Auditor General from 2005 and a 
graph, contained in this report, showing past and projected subsidies paid to the train 
franchisees. This graph is reproduced below in Figure 1, with the original explanatory notes 
from the Auditor General‟s report (p. 25). 
This graph was used to argue that: 
the privatisation of Melbourne‟s trams and trains has been an expensive failure. By 
June 2006, the privatised system will have cost $1.2 billion more in public subsidies 
than continued operation by the former PTC (Mees et al. 2006).   
The Department of Infrastructure2 attempted to refute this claim (DoI 2007, p. 9) by arguing 
that the Auditor General had not included adjustments for inflation – a clear 
misrepresentation of the original graph as the explanatory notes in Figure 1 show. It also 
argued that most of the subsidy increase was spent on new rolling stock, staff and services. 
However, analysis of Annual Reports shows that expenditure on these items made up only 
55 percent of the total subsidy payment (Figure 2). The unaccounted sum, which amounted 
to $122 million in 2005, is described by the Auditor General as payment to “secure the 
franchisees‟ operation over the franchise period” (2005, p. 26). It should also be noted that 
these subsidy payments did not include fare revenues which were received directly by the 
operators. 
                                            
2
 The Victorian Department of Infrastructure became the Department of Transport in April 2008. 
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Figure 1: Graph from Victorian Auditor General – subsidies paid to train franchisees 
 
While both Connex and Yarra Trams managers generally accepted this analysis of the scale 
of growth in subsidies, both argued that this was offset by their cost risk, which was imposed 
through the mechanism of performance penalties (2009). Cliche points to penalties for 
breaches of performance standards imposed on Yarra Trams of $25 million in 2009. 
In the lead up to the 2009 re-tendering process, the heat came out of the previously intense 
debate about the costs of franchising with the surprisingly frank and anti-climatic admission 
by the then Minister for Public Transport Lynne Kosky that: "it's no cheaper…we have had to 
put a lot more money into the system" (Lucas 2009b). And, in the new contracts, annual 
performance penalties have been capped at $12 million, so removing the major element of 
cost risk.  
Current payments to train and tram operators are difficult to compare accurately with the 
2004/05 figures reported by the Auditor-General because payments now include fare 
revenues. The May 2010 state budget estimated that payments to train and tram operators 
would be $1.18 billion in the 2010/11 financial year. Adjusting for inflation and removing fare 
revenues (Budget Papers, ch. 3, p. 231), it can be broadly estimated that, on the same scale 
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as that used by the Auditor-General in 2005, the payment to operators would be around 
$700 million (or half as much again as indicated in the Auditor-General‟s forecasts).  
These blowouts in subsidies clearly have not been accompanied by a comparable 
improvement in services. It is beyond the scope of this paper to assess service quality 
performance in detail, but it is sufficient to note that the government‟s own target for 
customer satisfaction for trams and trains is, in the 2010 budget papers, put at only 70 
percent.  
Figure 2: Breakdown of increased subsidy by payment purpose 
 
2. Depoliticising public transport: relationships between 
government, franchisees and the public 
If, as seen in the previous section, franchising is costing more, why does the government 
persist with it? Political science theory provides one set of reasons. Government decisions 
since 1999 make sense if seen as an example of a desire to depoliticise the business of 
governing. Depoliticisation describes a mode of governance that includes: 
a range of tools, mechanisms and institutions through which politicians can attempt 
to move to an indirect relationship and/or seek to persuade the [public] that they can 
no longer be reasonably held responsible for a certain issue, policy field or … 
decision (Buller and Flinders 2005, pp. 295-296) 
This does not imply that the political dimension no longer exists; rather it suggests that the 
politician recognises an advantage in the appearance of distance.  
There is certainly much in the current operations of Melbourne‟s public transport system that 
any minister would wish to keep at arm‟s length, although it remains to be seen whether the 
electorate are persuaded that fault lies with the operators.  
Sources: Auditor General Victoria 
(2005); DoI (2007); various state agency 
Annual Reports. 
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Certainly, the operators recognised that the government was looking for “shield” when the 
ranking of public transport as an issue for voters went from a ranking of sixth at the time of 
the 2006 election to first place by early 2009 (Metcalfe et al. 2009). Both Metcalfe and 
Dennis Cliche, from Yarra Trams, made the unsurprising suggestion that this imperative was 
likely to have played a part in the government‟s decision to choose two new franchisees in 
June 2009.  
Metcalfe recognised the need for the government and the franchisee to maintain their 
working partnership by being scrupulous in defending each other in public. However, he felt 
that Connex had “gone too far, for little return, until too late in the piece”. He also said that 
most of the company‟s effort had gone into:  
maintaining and developing its partnership with the government and the department, 
at the expense of developing a relationship with customers. 
This exposes one of the risks of the franchise model described by BITRE economist Peter 
Kain, who argues that the creation of “„cosy‟ relationships between the franchisee and the 
government are regulatory capture in another guise” (2006, p. 62). 
Both Metcalfe and Cliche acknowledge that the private operators should play an active role 
in promoting public transport in public and political debate even to the extent, as Metcalfe 
said, of “making the relationship with the government difficult”. However, only Yarra Trams 
made significant efforts in this regard during the first decade of franchising, particularly 
through the work of its first CEO, Hubert Guyot, from 1999 to 2004. In Cliche‟s view, Guyot 
was able to: 
get people in [state and] local government, in Vicroads, and the public to some 
extent, to … understand how important trams were to the overall fabric of Melbourne 
[and to reverse their previous belief that] trams were a necessary evil or a freak of 
history. 
It is an interesting comment on both the franchising process and the government‟s transport 
policy priorities that, despite the fanfare surrounding the big public transport projects in the 
Victorian Transport Plan, no individual politician or official from the DoT has succeeded 
Guyot as a credible advocate for public transport as a competitor to the car. The absence of 
public figures able to carry a brief on technical issues in professional forums is illustrated by 
reference to a particular incident in the on-going debate about road-space priority – a central 
issue for tram management, which Guyot and Cliche had pursued in various forums.  
During 2009, the death of a cyclist prompted Melbourne City Council to re-consider the re-
allocation of space in Swanston St, the CBD‟s main spine. Because the timing of 
consultations coincided with the transfer of the tram franchise from Transdev to Keolis, 
Cliche was no longer on the scene. He had previously made very strong representations to 
the Lord Mayor, Robert Doyle, against the latter‟s election promise in 2008 to re-open 
Swanston St to cars. However, with Keolis just finding its feet, there were no institutional 
voices actively engaged in the debate on behalf of tram passengers and tram operational 
requirements, and the outcomes of the process reflect this. The absence of the operator only 
served to emphasise the silence of the Transport Minister and the DoT. 
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The very thin public offerings from the government and the DoT in relation to the practical 
operations of the $4 billion „Regional Rail Link‟ to bring Geelong trains to Southern Cross via 
Sunshine and Footscray provide another case in point, although there is not space in this 
paper to explore this in detail. 
2.2. Planning for growth 
Beyond finances and political positioning, the key question for the franchise model is this. 
How well does it work to plan and deliver public transport services that are needed to meet 
the current demand and, more crucially, to meet the challenges of peak oil, climate change, 
suburban social isolation and population growth?  
Planning for public transport is required at three levels, originally defined by van de Velde 
(1999) as: 
 Strategic – system objectives such as levels of accessibility, mode-share targets, and 
cost-recovery levels. 
 Tactical – translation of strategic objectives into system-wide service plans, such as 
design of networks choice of technologies and co-ordinating timetables. 
 Operational – translation of tactical planning into day-to-day operations such as 
workforce management and maintenance.   
Supporters of the franchise model, including the current Secretary of the DoT, argue that 
successful planning can be done under the franchise system through careful allocation of 
strategic, tactical and operational planning functions between the parties (Stanley et al. 
2006). Some critics, using evidence from cities that have achieved significant long-term 
growth in public transport patronage, argue that a regional public authority with staff skilled in 
the application of modern techniques network planning is necessary to ensure the tactical 
delivery of clear strategic objectives set by government through effective processes of 
community engagement (Mees 2010; Nielsen 2005). Recent research, to be reported at this 
conference, has shown some support for this model from Melbourne‟s private operators 
themselves (Lazanas and Stone 2010). 
Three issues are used to explore the planning and delivery of public transport services in 
Melbourne under the franchise model: the huge patronage targets contained in the first 
franchise contracts in 1999, the responses to the real growth in patronage on the trains since 
2005, and the efforts to give priority to trams on congested roads. 
2.3.1. Huge patronage growth targets in 1999 contracts 
In all four franchises signed in 1999, the bidders proposed large reductions in government 
subsidies over the life of the contracts (see Figure 1). These attractive propositions were 
based on the promise of large increases in patronage – up to 83 percent over fifteen years in 
the case of the National Express bid for Bayside Trains. Although, it has since become clear 
that the bidders intended to meet the subsidy shortfalls by cost cutting rather than by 
patronage growth.   
In hindsight, it is difficult to believe that anyone took seriously these projections for 
simultaneous cost reduction and patronage growth with no explicit program for service 
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improvements, and it is now unsurprising that the contracts based on such goals quickly 
unravelled. One can only assume that the TRU did little to validate the bidders‟ forecasts 
because they were blinded by ideology. 
Connex now says that it over-estimated the options for reform: “Alan Brown [Liberal 
Transport Minister from 1992-96] had done more than we realised” in cutting staff and 
removing inefficiencies within the government-run Public Transport Corporation (research 
interview). For its part, National Express was relying on a large-scale Thatcherite assault on 
wages and conditions that was stymied by the unexpected election of the ALP in late 1999 
and the strength of union resistance (Stone 2009b). In addition, the tactic of the operators 
was to promise high and sort it out later. As Cliche put it, “if you don‟t bid aggressively, you 
are not there to try and fix it”. 
There was another factor behind the ability of bidders to propose such large targets without 
having to set out any clear mechanisms for fulfilling their promises. That factor is the 
„disconnect‟ between stated government policies on public transport and the expectations of 
powerful figures within successive administrations of both parties – a characteristic feature of 
Melbourne transport policymaking since Steve Crabb‟s undermining of the ALP‟s „no 
freeway‟ policy in 1982 (Stone 2009a). 
The ALP may have set a target of „20% of all motorised trips by public transport by 2020‟ in 
the Melbourne 2030 strategic plan (DOI 2002), but this was quickly recast by the car-
oriented senior management of the DoI as an „aspirational‟ goal and largely ignored in the 
development of plans for further freeway construction. Moreover, whether they believed the 
target was possible or not, public transport managers were in a very weak position in the 
wider state bureaucracy. An illustration of just how weak is the fact that budget bids for 
extensions of the Epping rail line to South Morang (an ALP election promise) were included 
in forward estimates in the 2003 and then subsequently removed. 
It might be said, in light of the patronage growth spurt that began in 2005, that the original 
bid forecasts were simply premature. However, the state has twice had to bear the cost of 
false assumptions about future patronage. First, as we have seen, because it chose to bail 
out the private operators in 2004 and, second, because the 2005 patronage spurt came as a 
surprise to operators and departmental planners. 
2.3.2. Responding to patronage growth after 2005 
Patronage growth on both train and tram was first observed in 2005 and has continued. It  is 
welcome, although figures from BITRE (2009) show that Melbourne is not, as the DoT has 
claimed, “Australia‟s public transport capital” (DoT 2009, p. 11). The response of the 
government and Connex to this growth illustrates the exercise of the „tactical‟ planning 
function under Melbourne‟s franchise system.  
Despite the patronage targets in the original franchise agreements, “the reality is that no-one 
was planning for growth” (Metcalfe) until well after this „spurt‟ began. Government analysts 
(Gaymer and Kinnear 2009) accept that most new passengers were coming to the public 
transport for reasons external to the management of the system itself. These reasons 
include demographic changes such as growth in CBD employment and inner-city 
gentrification, rising petrol prices and growing environmental awareness. 
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The first response of planners in Connex and the DoI was to assume that the growing 
patronage was “a blip”. During 2005 and 2006 a range of explanations were postulated, 
including petrol price rises and a „boost‟ from the Commonwealth Games in March 2006. A 
common feature of these explanations was an assumption that growth would quite soon 
return the pattern of annual growth that had been seen consistently since about 1980. This 
growth of around 1.0-1.5 percent p.a. was roughly in line with population growth. 
Because the 2004 franchises were written on the assumption that this pattern of slow 
patronage growth would continue, there was no formal mechanism in the contracts to deal 
with the reality that the operators faced after 2006. As it became obvious that the rate of 
patronage growth was not abating, there was no clear direction for either party. 
The department‟s first response was to cobble together a package of capital works and 
service upgrades in Meeting Our Transport Challenges (DOI 2006). The „big ticket‟ items in 
this plan included a third track from Dandenong to Caulfield (since abandoned), the 
development of the SmartBus suburban orbital routes, and the procurement of additional 
rolling stock. It also marked the first assertions of an apparent „capacity crisis‟ in the 
operation of the inner city rail network. This theme was expanded upon in Sir Rod 
Eddington‟s  East West Links Needs Assessment (2008) and critiqued by Mees (2008) and 
Dotson (2009).  
Connex was not part of the development of this plan, which Metcalfe later described as “a 
grab bag of projects”. Its focus on infrastructure investment, rather than on the sorts of 
operational planning suggested by Mees and Dotson, can partly be explained by the 
absence of the operational perspective inside the DoT. 
There was, however, recognition of the need to involve the operator in future planning. In 
2006, a „retreat‟ attended by senior DoT and Connex officials resulted in what was called the 
„Lancefield Accord‟. This agreement set the groundwork for a new operating plan, which, 
with the attendant process of „network development partnerships‟, was written in to the new 
franchises. This new operating plan will deliver some simplified stopping patterns, run some 
citybound trains on the previously unused tracks that bypass the City Loop, and rely more on 
transfers for passengers to reach their destinations. This will allow the creation of new 
timetables that, if done effectively, will go some way towards maximising the impact of the 38 
new trains funded through MOTC and the later Victorian Transport Plan. 
This joint planning still only addressed short and medium term objectives. Connex had no 
engagement with the DoT in planning for the Regional Rail Link (from Werribee to the CBD 
via Sunshine) or the Metro Tunnel proposals. 
Connex managers suggest that too many planners, in its own ranks and in the DoT, are 
without experience beyond Melbourne. This observation is directly at odds with the 
government‟s claim that “innovation and international expertise” (Lucas 2009b) are the major 
benefits of the franchise model. 
The response to the unexpected patronage growth reveals significant problems with public 
transport planning in Melbourne. As a direct consequence of the franchise arrangements, 
operational and capital planning functions have been separated leading to poor outcomes 
such as MOTC, with its unhelpful reliance on capital works at the expense of operational 
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changes. This reliance on capital solutions explains, to some extent, the creation by the DoT 
of the so-called „capacity crisis‟ to justify its budget bids. Its defensiveness in response to 
criticisms by Mees and Dotson reinforces perceptions of a lack of skills within the 
Department and puts it in an invidious position of having to explain how it is that new 
capacity has now been found. This defensiveness extends to employing consultants to 
debunk their critics (Lucas 2010), and is direct contrast to the efforts of the successful public 
transport manager, Stuart Hicks in Perth, who made a point of finding ways to “deal with the 
objections (of his critics) constructively and so build a stronger consensus” (Stone 2009a, p. 
430). 
2.3.3. Getting priority for trams on congested roads 
The major planning issue for the tram operations in Melbourne is to improve tram speeds 
and reliability by reducing conflicts between trams and private cars. This is one objective of 
the Vicroads‟ SmartRoads Network Operating Plans (announced in Feb 2010) with the 
intention of defining “which transport modes have priority on the road at different times of the 
day” (Vicroads 2010).  
Many inner-suburban arterial roads in Melbourne are also busy shopping and commercial 
strips. This creates a conflict for road space between traffic flow and parking. Peak period 
parking bans – called „clearways‟ – are the principal tool used to manage this conflict. 
SmartRoads included a plan to extend the hours of „clearway‟ operation after 9 am and 
before 4 pm in many of these shopping precincts, sparking a fierce backlash from traders 
and local councils. Cliche says that SmartRoads was: 
clearly a car-driven strategy … but if we could take it and get something for trams it 
would be well worth it …Today, we have, at least, a symbolic statement that this is 
how Vicroads – with the sanction of government – will allocate road space in the 
future… To say „this is a priority route for public transport‟ would have been 
impossible five years ago. 
Although noting that it is still only symbolic, Cliche sees this as one of the few policy gains 
for trams in recent years. He found it very difficult to get serious attention paid to the needs 
for investment in the tram system because: 
The DoT mantra for years was „get the trains out of trouble and keep the trams off 
the front page‟ ... all our projects got pushed out … even in the last budget I was 
there (only) $5 million for tram (compared with) $880 million for (metro and country) 
trains … Kosky was very unsuccessful in getting us money. 
With only limited funds for discretionary projects such as improving signal priority, Cliche 
found a further bottleneck in a lack of resources for this function within Vicroads:  
with very little money (allocated to trams to start with), much of it was going to 
Vicroads to support the replacement of traffic signalling. 
Cliche fears that will be some time before the new franchisee will have the credibility and the 
local experience to be able to act effectively to reverse this situation. Particularly, he argues, 
because Keolis came to Melbourne with the intention of winning the train franchise:  
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the people they recruited for the bid were train people – their safety person came 
from Railcorp NSW, their COO ran a train station for SNCF. 
As Cliche understands the process, his company was the only respondent to the original 
expression of interest for the tram tender, and Keolis entered the field only after the 
government offered $5 million to potential bidders. Under the rules for the re-tendering, a 
consortium could bid for both the tram and train franchises, but would not be able to win 
both. Cliche believes that there was a tacit understanding that, by providing competition for 
the tram tender, Keolis would enhance its bid for the trains. While Cliche argues that his 
competitor‟s bid lacked detail and depth when compared to that of his own company, Keolis 
was seriously in the running for the train franchise, and was even rumoured to have won its 
bid (Lucas 2009a). However, in the end, it appears that a political imperative to „clear the 
decks‟ and an aggressive bid on price for trams may have left Keolis with a prize it had not 
intended to win. Cliche says that, for at least two weeks after the successful bidders were 
announced, the Keolis website read: „we are here to fix Melbourne‟s trains‟.  
3.  Conclusion 
The Melbourne experiment in public transport franchising has been assessed against three 
important parameters: its financial performance, its role as tool for distancing government for 
responsibility for operational performance, and its impact on the effectiveness of planning for 
future improvements in service and in patronage. 
 
On the financial measure, the government and the operators appear to broadly accept that 
public subsidies for public transport operations are have grown faster than any 
corresponding output in service quantity or quality. 
 
As a tool for managing political risk, a number of decisions, including those relating to the 
most recent re-tendering, appear to a considerable extent to have been made in order to 
manage short-term political concerns. The ultimate success of this tactic will be tested at the 
November state election.     
 
The interviews with the departing franchisees reveal how planning for growth of public 
transport in Melbourne is hampered by the rigidity of contract definitions and by the 
fragmentation of responsibilities between franchisees and the government. However, even 
though these are significant problems, and probably represent fatal flaws in the franchise 
model, they are a less significant than the lack of real political support for public transport 
solutions to Melbourne‟s transport problems. Without genuine engagement from political 
leaders, departmental managers will be able to continue their defensive attitude to ideas and 
criticisms from policy analysts and from the wider community, and poorly developed 
programs and policies will continue to be brought forward. 
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